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The Evolution of the European Union’s 
Asylum Policy Through the 2015 Migrant 
Crisis
Roshni J. Sopariwalla
University of California, Santa Barbara
Abstract
 Since 2015, an unexpected number of migrants have rushed to the European 
Union in hopes of improving their lives. Contrary to their expectations, asylum-seekers 
realized that the EU is neither prepared nor willing to host them. This paper follows the 
progression of the EU’s asylum policies, beginning with the 1951 Geneva Convention and 
the principle of non-refoulement. After establishing the criteria necessary for a migrant to 
be legally recognized as a refugee, the paper will look at how the EU evaluates individual 
applications for asylum. Through the lens of the 2015 Migrant Crisis, this paper highlights 
the shortcomings of the current, minimal asylum policies. The paper then concludes by 
evaluating a 2016 proposal to reconcile the EU’s member states’ respective asylum policies 
through a single, harmonious asylum policy.
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2015 Migrant Crisis, Asylum Policy, Common European Asylum System, migrant, 
refugee
Evolution of the EU's Asylum Policy
1 3 2 Roshni J. Sopariwalla University of California, Santa Barbara
INTRODUCTION
The European Union (EU) has experienced unprecedented numbers of migrants 
attempt to enter its borders and establish residency within its member states. Simultaneously, 
EU countries have received unrivaled numbers of asylum applications. Many of the people 
coming to the EU are hoping to escape travesties at home like the Syrian Civil War, the 
war in Afghanistan, or conscription in the Eritrean National Service Program – often 
accompanied by “arbitrary detention, sexual torture, forced labor, and slavery-like prac-
tices” (Laub, 2016). Regardless of the specific reason, all of these migrants are searching for 
better lives for themselves and their families within the EU. 
Since 2015, the EU has taken a limited number of steps in an attempt to tackle the 
migrant crisis. They have proposed a quota system whereby each member state would be 
told how many refugees they must accommodate, and they have forged a tumultuous deal 
with Turkey. The EU is also trying to improve the Common European Asylum System so 
as to better harmonize the practices related to accepting refugees across all member states. 
These attempts have proven to be painfully inadequate and ineffective when contextualized 
by the number of people who still desperately need help and protection. The EU has failed 
to properly care for asylum seekers or to establish an efficient method to process and evalu-
ate their applications. Additionally, many of the countries within the EU are still refusing to 
accept and distribute the incoming immigrants, instead choosing to leave that responsibility 
on outer nations that physically receive the immigrants first. 
 This paper will track the advancement of EU asylum policy starting off with the 
1951 Geneva Convention and the fundamental idea of non-refoulement. It will then take a 
look at the various directives that the EU has established in order to conform to this inter-
national law. By looking at the various actions that EU states have taken following the 2015 
crisis, this paper will illuminate the existing drawbacks of EU asylum policy. It will also take 
a detailed look at three groups of countries – those that have openly invited refugees into 
their borders, those who have attempted to close their borders, and those who are forced 
to deal with the brunt of the refugees because of their geographic position. The paper will 
then conclude by discussing the future of the EU asylum system and the changes that the 
EU hopes to enact in the coming years. 
MIGRANT VERSUS REFUGEE
 Although the terms “migrant” and “refugee” have often been used interchange-
ably, there is an important legal distinction, especially within the context of the 2015 
Migrant Crisis. All of the people who have left their home countries to make the journey 
into the European Union are migrants because they left “one country or region to settle in 
another...in search of a better life” (Glossary). The term “refugee”, however, only applies 
to a narrow subset of migrants. Article 1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention and Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Geneva Convention) defines a refugee as a person: 
who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country. (Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees)
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 This difference is especially important because it determines just how much pro-
tection the EU is legally obliged to provide a migrant who enters a member state. Pursuant 
to Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention, the primary difference in the way migrants 
and refugees are treated is called “non-refoulement” (Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees). Essentially, countries are not allowed to send refugees back 
to countries where there the person’s life or liberty would threatened because of their race, 
religion, gender, political ideology, sexual orientation, or other inherent characteristics. 
Currently, people who are fleeing from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq are considered the most 
viable candidates for refugee status because there is widespread knowledge of the ongoing 
conflict in their home countries. This idea that people should not be subject to condi-
tions where their life and freedom are at risk is now one of the most fundamental tenets 
of international law according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) (Edwards, 2015). 
Migrants who choose to leave their countries for reasons that do not involve the 
possibility of immediate death or loss of freedom do not qualify for refugee status. Other 
reasons that migrants choose to leave their home countries can include a search for bet-
ter economic opportunities or the chance to reunite with family members. Unlike with 
refugees, EU member states are at liberty to deport migrants who arrive to their country 
without the required documentation.  Thus, an EU state’s ability to distinguish between 
economic migrants and refugees ultimately affects the rights that a person arriving in the EU 
has. Furthermore, this decision can either save a person from an unsafe situation or return 
them back to a country where their life and liberty are seriously compromised.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
 The 1951 Geneva Convention was created by the UNHCR and is an interna-
tional law that is binding upon the EU member states. The following subsections will walk 
through the history of EU asylum policy and its attempts to conform to the rules of the 
1951 Geneva Convention.
The 1951 Refugee Convention & Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
The UNHCR is the primary United Nations body responsible for work and poli-
cies regarding the rights and fair treatment of refugees. They consider the 1951 Refugee 
Convention & Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to be the cornerstone of their 
policies (United Nations). This document and its binding principles ultimately served as the 
starting point for future EU executive orders regarding refugee treatment. 
 In regards to the 2015 Migrant Crisis, the most relevant portion of the 1951 
Geneva Convention comes from Article 33. Article 33 establishes the principle of non-
refoulement, forbidding nations from sending back migrants for whom there is a legitimate 
reason to expect that they are at threat in their countries of origin (Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). 
 Aside from the humanitarian principle of non-refoulement, the 1951 Geneva 
Convention actually offers very little guidance as to how a migrant should be treated upon 
arrival into a country. Boccardi claims that the overall spirit of the Geneva Convention was 
“inspired by the wish to afford recognized refugees a treatment as similar to the State’s own 
nationals” (Boccardi, 2002, p. 110). This concept was meant to be materialized through 
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provisions like employment, welfare, administrative assistance, freedom of movement, and 
the ability to transfer assets (Boccardi, 2002, p. 110). Unfortunately, these goals did not 
materialize in most EU member states as is evident in the 2015 Migrant Crisis. There is no 
international law, from the EU or otherwise, that establishes specific rules on how refugees 
could be fully integrated into an EU state; the limited available instructions on how refugees 
should be treated comes from various non-binding directives and weak regulations. While 
it was recommended that states maintain passable conditions for the refugees they take in, 
there are no objective rules defining how or to what extent a state is to ensure these condi-
tions. Thus, it is up to individual member states to fill in these gaps, which in turn leads to 
a very varied treatment of refugees from state to state.
The 1990s and the Need for a Common Asylum Policy in the EU
The aforementioned lack of guidance for situations of mass refugee arrival has had 
negative consequences in the past. For example, this lack of guidance negatively affected 
refugee-seekers during the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. In following the minimal rules 
established by the 1951 Geneva Convention, each of the EU member states did have some 
form of policy to accept refugees, “but practices varied greatly” (Boccardi, 2002, p. 112). 
It was the “acknowledgement of these differences [which] pushed forward the idea that 
some sort of harmonization in the field [of asylum policy] was needed” (Boccardi, 2002, 
p. 112). Some member states were specifically interested in creating a single asylum policy 
because of the uneven distribution of asylum applications they were receiving: “In 1992, 
Germany and Austria received 450,000 refugees from former Yugoslavia, the Nordic coun-
tries 110,000 and Spain, Italy, France, and Great Britain together only 55,000” (Boccardi, 
2002, p. 112). Such variation among the number of asylum applications led to different 
amounts of pressure on member states and really served as the catalyst for the idea of “bur-
den sharing”. 
But even after numerous EU states expressed interest in forming a uniform asylum 
policy, very few changes were actually put into place. Progress in creating such a plan was 
extremely slow: “‘the 1994 Commission Communication on asylum and immigration poli-
cies’ pointed out that despite the specific initiative for former Yugoslavia, no protection or 
[attempt] to set up an effective system of burden sharing” had been created yet. Member 
states thus “recommended the harmonization of national temporary protection schemes and 
the setting up of a monitoring system to help member states in situations of mass influx to 
share the refugee burden” (Boccardi, 2002, p. 113). This proposal was strongly opposed at 
the time by interior member states who were dealing with significantly smaller numbers 
of refugees and which, according to the plan, would have to substantially increase their 
refugee intake (Boccardi, 2002, p. 113). Because none of the member states were ready to 
increase their individual responsibilities, there was a constant lack of consensus between the 
interior and exterior EU states. 
 In 1996 some headway was made in formulating an asylum policy with the pro-
posal of a resolution to create a “rapid response mechanism” that could be enacted when 
a situation of mass refugee arrival arose (Boccardi, 2002, p. 114). The resolution essentially 
suggested that if there were to be a situation where refugees arrived in huge numbers, an 
emergency meeting could be called where a certain number of refugees would be allocated 
to each of the member states (Boccardi, 2002, p. 114). This resolution was the EU’s first 
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attempt at proposing a quota system. Much as it did when attempted in the 2015 Migrant 
Crisis, this system was tested and failed miserably during the Kosovo crisis towards the end 
of the 20th century. It ultimately “proved impossible to achieve any consensus on refugee 
quotas. Each member state was only looking out for its own bests interests, which led to 
undignified ‘squabbles’ among Member States, proving once more that a better framework 
was urgently needed” (Boccardi, 2002, p. 114). This “extreme lack of Community solidar-
ity” laid the groundwork for the EU to enter the 21st century without a plan of action for 
a situation in which migrants arrive en mass to the EU (Boccardi, 2002, p. 113).  
The Common European Asylum System (CEAS)
Another attempt to harmonize the various asylum policies of EU member states 
began in 1999 with the creation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The 
overarching mission of the CEAS is to formulate a uniform asylum policy across all twenty-
eight member states that would allow the outcome of an asylum application to remain 
constant, regardless of in which country the application is processed (Common European 
Asylum System). There are now three fundamental goals that serve as the basis for future 
CEAS development:
1. Harmonize standards of protection by further aligning EU asylum legislation 
among member states
2. Seek effective and well supported practical cooperation among countries
3. Increase solidarity and a sense of responsibility within the EU (Common European 
Asylum System)
The new CEAS also hopes to provide people applying for asylum quicker responses to their 
applications. So many more people than expected are seeking admission into the EU cur-
rently and thus, more applications are being submitted than are being processed. Because 
applications are not being processed quickly enough, migrants have been spending exces-
sive amounts of time in overcrowded refugee camps. Livable conditions such as appropriate 
housing, plumbing, and access to resources are also compromised because of the amount of 
time that the EU takes to process applications for asylum. 
Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013: The Dublin Regulation 
 The first piece of legislation that the EU created regarding asylum applications is 
the Dublin Regulation. It was established in June of 2013 to assign responsibility for pro-
cessing asylum applications within the EU. The regulation establishes that the first country 
in which a migrant is fingerprinted and documented – ideally the first EU member state 
that the migrant reaches – is the country responsible for processing the migrant’s applica-
tion and determining their ultimate placement (Country Responsible). This policy is meant 
to prevent migrants from “asylum shopping” or sending their applications for asylum to 
numerous EU states hoping that at least one is approved (Boccardi, 2002, p. 43). Similarly, 
the Dublin Regulation is intended to prevent “asylum orbiting”: a situation in which no 
country takes responsibility for an asylum seeker (Boccardi, 2002, 44). If the migrant moves 
out of the initial state, any subsequent state retains the right to send the migrant back to the 
state that they first entered. While the Dublin Regulation was intended to be a clear cut 
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process for dividing and processing asylum applications, it did not account for the unprec-
edented numbers of migrants that have come at one time to a few countries, as is the case 
with the current migrant crisis. Consequently, under the Dublin Regulation it is primarily 
periphery states like Hungary, Italy, and Greece that are forced to address the issues of the 
migrant crisis, while others gladly enjoy the opportunity to take a laxer approach.
Directive 2011/95/EU: 2011 Directive on Standards for Qualification 
 In 2011, the EU created the 2011 Qualification Directive to “lay down standards 
for the qualification of 3rd country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of inter-
national protection” (Council Directive No. 2011/95/EU, p. 1). This directive is the key 
piece of EU legislation that the EU relies on when deciding whether to categorize a per-
son as a refugee or not. Therefore, this directive is meant to establish guidelines that helps 
determine who can stay in the EU and who will be sent back to their country of origin. 
Despite the aforementioned life-altering decisions that are based upon interpretation of this 
document, the defined requirements for refugee status are extremely vague. As such, the 
document does not provide much structure or information as to how exactly member states 
are expected to process the applications of incoming refugees. 
For example, Article 4 discusses the “assessment of facts and circumstances” that 
will determine if refugee status will be granted. Subsection (b) requires that member states 
evaluate “relevant statements and documentation presented by the applicant, including 
information on whether the applicant has been or may be subject to persecution or serious 
harm” (Council Directive No. 2011/95/EU, p. 6). The majority of this definition hinges 
on an individual’s subjective interpretation of these concepts. The definition gives no way 
of evaluating, for instance, which documents and statements qualify as “relevant”; there is 
no procedure in place that is meant to help determine when a person is considered to be 
in legitimate threat of either persecution or serious harm in their home country. The few 
feeble attempts to clarify such definitions are equally vague, rendering them useless. For 
instance, the term “serious harm” is defined in Article 15 as the “death penalty”, “torture 
and inhuman or degrading treatment”, or “serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or 
person by reason of indiscriminate violence” (Council Directive No. 2011/95/EU, p. 10). 
This definition allows readers to understand “serious harm” as including the death penalty, 
however, the directive neglects to establish what actions qualify as “torture” or what type 
of behavior is considered “degrading” enough to warrant refugee status and protection. 
As it stands, this eighteen-page document is currently one of the key tenets for EU 
refugee policy, but fails to establish proper guidelines that member states should search for 
when evaluating a candidate for asylum. 
Directive 2013/33/EU: 2013 Directive on Reception Standards
 In 2013 the EU put forth the 2013 Directive “laying down standards for the 
reception of applicants for international protections” in an attempt to outline the general 
practices that should be followed upon a migrant’s arrival to the EU. Keeping in mind the 
1951 Geneva Convention and that EU member states have to adhere to the rules of the 
non-refoulement policy, the EU Commission decided to create guidelines regarding how 
refugees should be treated while they wait for their applications for asylum to be processed. 
This 2013 Directive is actually a revised version of a 2003 Directive on the same matter and 
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has been updated “in the interests of clarity” (Council Directive No. 2013/33/EU, p. 1). 
In looking at this document, this paper will focus on two clauses that establish procedures 
regarding how refugees should be treated and the existing pitfalls of these guidelines.  
While an individual’s application for asylum is being processed, the EU deter-
mined that they were entitled to receive information on the status of their application and 
their legal rights within the member state that they waited in. Pursuant to Article 5, refugees 
are entitled to receive “any established benefits and [information regarding] the obligations 
with which [the member states] must comply relating to reception conditions” within fif-
teen days after lodging their application for international protection (Council Directive No. 
2013/33/EU, p. 5). This rule in and of itself is commendable in its attempt to guarantee 
that refugee seekers are provided necessary information and are not left confused about 
their status within the member state. Part of Article 5 requires that applicants receive vital 
information regarding available legal assistance and health care, but this effort is undermined 
by Article 5, Section 2 which mandates that the information be provided in “a language 
that the applicant understands or is reasonably supposed to understand” (Council Directive 
No. 2013/33/EU, p. 5). This requirement can easily lead to some people not receiving the 
information in a language that they actually understand because there is an assumption that 
they are supposed to “reasonably” understand the language. The UNHCR voiced a similar 
concern when it read and evaluated the 2013 Receptions Directive and recommended that 
“information be provided in a language that the applicants actually understand” in order 
to “ensure full comprehension of and engagement in the asylum procedure” (UNHCR). 
Furthermore, Article 17 Sections 1 and 2 of the 2013 Directive mandates that 
“material reception conditions are available to applicants when they make their applica-
tion for international protection” and that these conditions “provide an adequate standard 
of living for the applicants, which guarantees their subsistence and protects their physical 
and mental health” (Council Directive No. 2013/33/EU, p. 9). Unfortunately, the 2015 
Migrant Crisis illuminates multiple problems with keeping in line with this directive. First 
and foremost, one can see the same problems exhibited in the 2011 Directive in that its 
terms are vague; there are no guidelines to help determine what qualifies as an “adequate 
standard of living” or how EU member states are meant to protect the physical and mental 
health of refugees coming from outside countries. When focusing on the conditions that 
refugees arrive to in the EU, especially in countries like Italy and Greece, it will become 
apparent that the EU has failed to follow these guidelines and that the refugees are forced 
to endure unlivable conditions. 
THE 2015 MIGRANT CRISIS
 Migrants have chosen to leave their respective countries of origin and to flee to 
the EU for a variety of reasons which are further discussed in the following section. The 
reception migrants receive upon their arrivals, however, falls on a wide spectrum; some 
countries are prepared to welcome migrants, while others take all imaginable actions to 
ensure that other potential-refugees are deterred from arriving into the EU altogether. 
Homeland Conditions
 Since 2015, millions of people have been immigrating into the EU in search of the 
security and stability that their home countries can no longer provide them with. There are 
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various reasons for which migrants choose to leave their home countries; currently, migrants 
are primarily motivated by political instability and conflict. According to BBC’s overview 
of the migrant crisis, most migrants coming into the EU are from Syria, Afghanistan, and 
Iraq (Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe). In 2015, over 350,000 migrants came from 
Syria to enter the EU and over 150,000 migrants came from Afghanistan; in compari-
son, only 30,000 migrants came from Eritrea, and about 22,000 migrants came from Iran 
(Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe). 
In recent months, the violence in Syria has forced millions to leave their homes 
in search of safer prospects. People initially fled to neighboring countries like Iraq, Jordan, 
Lebanon, and Turkey in hopes of either resettling or moving on to the EU (Migrant Crisis: 
EU-Turkey Deal). Others are also fleeing from Afghanistan and Iraq to the EU in search 
of safety. As of September 2015, Afghans made up thirteen percent of the population of 
people seeking refuge in Europe (Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe). In Afghanistan, the 
conflict is only worsening. Despite the fact that Afghanistan is no longer at the forefront 
of media attention, Human Rights Watch – a nongovernmental organization focused on 
reporting human rights violations globally – argues that “[migrants] know well the risks of 
drowning at sea or suffocating in a truck. But for those living with escalating violence and 
daily threats from gunmen, it can seem like a chance worth taking” (Gossman, 2015). This 
quote reveals the sordid state of many migrants’ home countries and indicates that despite 
the dangers involved, the EU can easily expect the flow of immigrants to remain steady. 
Host-land Conditions
There are three main ways in which individual EU countries have approached 
the 2015 Migrant Crisis. First, there are countries that are concerned about human rights 
violations and were the most willing to accept refugees through their borders. This group 
includes countries like Germany and Sweden. The next group of countries fall on the 
opposite end of the spectrum; countries like Austria and Hungary have displayed a highly 
xenophobic mindset and consequently want nothing to do with incoming migrants. Thus, 
these countries have taken extreme actions to prevent migrants from entering their country. 
The final group of countries are those like Greece and Italy, which are located along the 
Mediterranean border. These countries have inherently felt the brunt of the crisis on their 
shoulders because their geographic position puts them at the end of the main migration 
routes into Europe.
Germany 
 Since 2012, Germany has proven itself to be one of the most tolerant countries 
when it comes to accepting refugees affected by different homeland crises, especially those 
impacted by the Syrian Civil War. Between the years 2012 and 2014, Germany received 
61,885 Syrian asylum claims (Ostrand, 2015, p. 269). In August of 2015, Germany’s Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees publicly announced that Germany would not be return-
ing any refugees coming from Syria (2015 in Review). Claiming that “there is no tolerance 
of those who are not ready to help, where, for legal and humanitarian reasons, help is due” 
Chancellor Angela Merkel invited refugees and immigrants to come to Germany (Hutton, 
2015). News of Germany’s Willkommenskultur (“Welcome Culture”) spread quickly, and by 
the first weekend of September 2015, Germany took in over 20,000 refugees – the same 
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amount ex-Prime Minister David Cameron of the United Kingdom agreed to take over 
the course of five years (Germany! Germany!). Germany expected to receive about 800,000 
asylum applications in 2015, but ultimately received 1 million applications by December 
2015 (Germany Registers Record 1.1 Million Asylum Seekers). 
At first, Chancellor Merkel’s decision to open Germany’s arms to over a mil-
lion refugees was considered a welcome change from Germany’s previous anti-foreigner 
principles and practices. Unfortunately, with continued exposure, the Willkommenskultur 
quickly faded. Towards the end of December 2015, a group of migrant men and asylum 
seekers robbed and sexually assaulted German women in Cologne, Germany (Germany’s 
Refugee Crisis). This news did not garner much media attention until June of 2016. By 
this point, tensions were already high and many Germans had begun to feel that Chancellor 
Merkel made a mistake admitting so many refugees, questioning “when it would end and...
exactly how so many people from other cultures were going to be absorbed” (Germany’s 
Refugee Crisis). 
Hungary
 Hungary’s approach to the 2015 Migrant Crisis falls on the complete opposite end 
of the spectrum from Germany. From the beginning, Hungary has taken an anti-immi-
grant approach. In her 1996 book Refugees and Asylum: A Community Perspective, Rebecca 
Wallace states that: 
economic and social changes within the EU Member States have led to increased 
levels of racism and xenophobia. Correspondingly, perceptions that immigrants 
regularly submit bogus claims for asylum have also increased. This has precipitated 
greater restrictions being imposed by national governments. (Wallace, 1996, p. 11) 
These same ideals are reflected in Hungary’s practices today. Towards the end of 
2015, when refugees arrived to Hungary, they were sent en mass to Germany (Kirby).  In 
comparison to the Willkommenskultur established in Germany, Hungarian Prime Minister 
Viktor Orbán has expressed many xenophobic feelings. In a speech at the 14th Kötcse Civil 
Picnic to the public and fellow politicians Prime Minister Orbán blamed liberalization and 
“the Islamization of Europe” for the refugee crisis (Kirby). His speech describes “refugees 
of the past” as people that were “running for their lives” who “sought refuge beyond the 
nearest available state border [where] they hunkered down in safety, expecting to return, 
because they wanted to go home at some time” (Viktor Orbán’s Speech). But because the 
horrors that many refugees have experienced in their homeland countries have proven 
unlivable and intolerable, they are choosing to risk their lives to permanently resettle in 
other countries –  often times within the EU. Prime Minister Orbán seems suspicious 
of this “different” behavior and claims that Hungary is now “inundated with countless 
immigrants”, states that “there is an invasion, [that the refugees] break down fences...[that] 
they are not seeking refuge, and are not running for their lives” (Viktor Orbán’s Speech). 
He continues to argue that Hungary cannot be a country any longer if it is to allow refugees 
in because doing so would leave it “unable to defend its borders” (Viktor Orbán’s Speech). 
He also argues that Hungry needs to “protect its ethnic and cultural composition” (Viktor 
Orbán’s Speech). Claiming that Hungary is “colorful and diverse enough”, Prime Minister 
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Orbán has put up razor wire fences around Hungary’s perimeter in an attempt to protect 
its national borders from refugees. 
Even more recently, Prime Minister Orbán called migration a “Trojan horse for 
terrorism” and has declared that all asylum seekers who come to Hungary will be forced 
into detention camps (Wintour). These detention camps are to be nothing more than 
standard shipping containers surrounded by barbed wire in order to ensure that migrants 
cannot escape. In these desolate conditions, migrants will be forced to wait for their cases 
to be heard via video-link in order to “save Europe” from the force that Prime Minister 
Orbán perceives to be a threat to “European Christian identity and culture” (Wintour). 
This measure passed with an overwhelming majority vote of 138 votes for the proposal to 
6 votes against the proposal, with 22 abstentions (Wintour). 
One would normally expect that these actions are considered illegal and in direct 
violation of the EU directive regarding reception conditions for those seeking refuge in 
the EU. As the 2013 Receptions Directive, Article 17 clearly states that an “adequate 
standard of living for applicants” be provided, it logically appears as if forcing migrants to 
live in shipping containers should be punishable. But because there are no clear standards 
established as to what exactly qualifies as an “adequate” standard of living, Hungary is not 
necessarily violating the directive and their actions remain unpunished.
Numerous organizations concerned with human rights violations have vehe-
mently spoken against Prime Minister Orbán’s actions. Amnesty International denounced 
Hungary’s decision to “dump all refugees and migrants into containers” as a “flagrant viola-
tion of international law” (Wintour). The Amnesty International director for Europe, Gauri 
van Gulik, also stated that “rounding up all men, women and children seeking asylum 
and detaining them months on end in container camps is a new low in Hungary’s race to 
the bottom on asylum seekers and refugees” (Wintour). The UNHCR also condemned 
Hungary’s actions claiming that “the new law ‘violates Hungary’s obligations under 
international and EU laws, and will have a terrible physical and psychological impact on 
women, children, and men who have already greatly suffered’” (Wintour). In addition to 
these actions, Hungary is also adamantly standing behind a proposition to put up a second 
electrified fence along the border separating Hungary from Serbia. This fence is scheduled 
to be complete by May 1, 2017 (Wintour). 
Italy 
European countries along the eastern Mediterranean have also seen massive 
influxes in the number of migrants coming to them. In order to reach Northern countries 
in the EU, refugees typically travel through Greece and Italy. Because of rules preventing 
migrants from travelling further into the EU, these people are often forced into worse and 
worse conditions: into cramped tents with minimal water and increasingly subpar standards 
for hygiene (Greece). These conditions are the norm in migrant camps which have “dingy, 
airless corridors thick with the odor of sweat” and sleeping mats soaked with “sewage 
which had overflowed from the day earlier” (Alderman, 2016). The small islands of Lesbos, 
Chios, and Samos currently hold over 10,000 immigrants from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq 
(Sessa-Hawkins, 2015). At the height of the migrations, 107,843 people arrived in Greece 
– another country along the Mediterranean border – within a single month (Greece).
Italy, similarly, is a key point of entry for migrants attempting to enter the EU. 
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Italy has been placed in a unique position throughout the entirety of the Refugee crisis. 
As one of the states on the Mediterranean border, Italy is one of the few countries that 
constantly is a first-arrival country for refugees.  As of October 2016, Italy has officially 
“overtaken Greece as the main point of entry for refugees and migrants trying to enter 
Europe” (Baczynska, 2016). In 2015 154,000 refugees arrived to Italy and in 2016 over 
160,00 refugees arrived. This statistic inherently excludes refugees that travelled undetected 
or were able to enter another EU country without being fingerprinted and registered while 
in Italy (Connor, 2016). 
As a border state, Italy bears an uneven amount of the responsibility associated 
with caring for incoming refugees. Unless the other EU states agreeing to harmonize their 
asylum policy, states like Italy and Greece will continue to crumble under the pressure of 
taking care of so many refugees, worsening the situations that the refugees themselves are 
put through. 
LOOKING FORWARD
 Fortunately, the EU also recognizes the shortcomings of the current asylum 
policy and the need for change. First Vice President of the European Commission Frans 
Timmermans stated that:
[T]he refugee crisis has shown the weakness in our Common European Asylum 
System...The current system is not sustainable. Different national approaches 
have fuelled asylum shopping and irregular migration, while we have seen in the 
ongoing crisis that the Dublin rules have placed too much responsibility on just a 
few Member States. In the immediate term we have to apply the existing law to 
stabilize the situation. Beyond that, we need a sustainable system for the future, 
based on common rules, a fairer sharing of responsibility, and safe legal channels 
for those who need protection to get it in the EU. (European Commission) 
Twenty years ago, the author Rebecca Wallace wrote in her book that “despite harmo-
nization attempts, considerable differences remain between European states regarding the 
procedures which are followed and standards which are met when examining and deciding 
upon applications for refugee status” (Wallace, 1996, p. 59-60). These inconsistencies lead 
to different practices and approaches to a situation like the 2015 Migrant Crisis. In the cur-
rent crisis, it is clear that some countries have unwittingly accepted many more refugees 
than they can reasonably accommodate while other countries staunchly refuse to accept that 
refugees have a valid claim to leave their homes and enter the EU at all. 
Understanding the wide scope of issues that have come about as a result of this 
uneven asylum policy, Amnesty International produced a paper calling “for a binding con-
vention on minimum standards of asylum procedure” in order to amend serious deficiencies 
in the existing practices. Some areas where Amnesty International hopes to see change in 
EU Asylum Policy is in developing “appropriate determination bodies” to assess the valid-
ity of an asylum claim, in better explicitly defining key terms like “safe third countries”, 
and establishing a proper, reasonable time for the application to be turned around to the 
applicant (Wallace, 1996, p. 61). Despite being written twenty years ago, this book discusses 
many of the issues that the EU Commission still hopes to address today, proving that creat-
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ing change and improvement in the EU is a rather slow process. 
In response to the current crisis and the clear shortcomings of the policy the EU 
currently follows, the European Commission released a proposal for a “Regulation...for the 
qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international 
protection” in mid 2016. This proposal recognizes that “there are still notable differences 
between the Member States in the types of procedures used, the reception conditions pro-
vided to applicants, the recognition rates and the type of protection granted to beneficiaries 
of international protection” (Proposal, Page 2). As such, this proposal is the EU’s attempt 
at “working towards an integrated, sustainable and holistic EU migration policy based on 
solidarity and fair sharing of responsibilities” (Proposal, 2). Such a policy could be essential 
in deterring another situation like the current one in which a small number of states are 
forced to process applications for millions of refugees under the provisions of the current 
Dublin Regulation. 
The Commission intends to adopt four proposals so as to strengthen the Common 
European Asylum System: 
1. A proposal replacing the Asylum Procedures Directive with a Regulation, 
creating a genuine, legally-binding, common procedure
2. Proposal replacing the Qualification Directive with a Regulation setting 
uniform standards for the recognitions of people in need of protection 
and the rights they are granted 
3. A proposal revising the Receptions Conditions Directive, harmonizing 
reception conditions in the EU even further 
4. Proposal for a structured Union resettlement framework, moving 
towards a more managed approach to international protection within 
the EU, ensuring safe pathways to the EU with the aim of reducing the 
incentives for irregular arrivals. (Proposal, 3)
CONCLUSION
 The EU clearly never expected as many refugees to attempt to enter its borders 
as is the case in the 2015 Migrant Crisis. As such, the current institutions and people are 
not well equipped to handle the millions of people who are moving toward and through 
EU borders. This inability is clearly reflected by the camps of migrants who are still await-
ing a decision regarding their applications for asylum in some of the most horrific condi-
tions imaginable. The repugnant conditions that migrants find themselves in highlights the 
inability of the EU to rapidly respond to emerging crises in and near their borders. The 
Dublin Regulation currently puts the full onus on processing these applications on states 
that first receive the refugees, in this case the states along the Eastern Mediterranean. This 
regulation leads to an uneven distribution of responsibility among the twenty-eight EU 
states. Consequently, the Dublin Regulation needs to be rewritten – if not completely 
eliminated – understanding the need to have all member states more equally assist with the 
asylum application process. Furthermore, in a disturbing lack of solidarity, some countries 
within the EU have decided that the Refugee Crisis is not a problem that they are willing 
to deal with, using xenophobic principles to underline the clear fact that they do not want 
to help accommodate the refugees. Fortunately, the EU does recognize that there are many 
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shortcomings in the current system and is working towards rectifying these issues in the 
coming years. 
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